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Political diplomacy of the People's Republic of China towards Indonesia (1949-1954)

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ANNOTATION

Indonesia occupies a distinguished position due to the importance of its geostrategic location for China, Indonesia is located opposite China and is not separated from China by the South China Sea, and it is obvious that China is working to extend its political arms in Indonesia, so Chinese policy towards Indonesia during the years (1949-1954) was characterized by caution. Moreover, this policy was subject to international and regional tensions.

The choice of the topic (Chinese-Indonesian diplomatic rapprochement 1949-1954) lies in the fact that the two countries were going through a transitional phase, as China was emerging from a civil war that lasted for two decades, while Indonesia was not in a better condition than it, as it also suffered from the Japanese occupation and the Dutch occupation. As well as the restrictions and international agreements that shackled it during independence.

Through these premises, the importance of studying (Chinese-Indonesian diplomatic rapprochement 1949-1954) appears, as this study will reflect to us the nature of Chinese diplomatic behavior towards Indonesia, accompanied by the great international competition over Indonesia between the United States of America and the Soviet Union.

KEYWORDS: geostrategic location, international and regional tensions, civil war.

Introduction

Scope of research and analysis of sources

The year 1949 was the beginning of the independence of China and Indonesia and the initiation of a new phase in the history of political relations between the two sides. The researcher found a stop at the end of 1954, as this year witnessed a major shift in relations through the signing of the Chinese-Indonesian Treaty in 1955,

as well as the Bandung Conference in 1955. Through which relations between the two countries were normalized in international forums.

The first topic (the beginning of the Chinese-Indonesian diplomatic rapprochement 1949-1951) came to shed light on Indonesia's independence and its recognition by China, as well as the Chinese endeavor to obtain diplomatic representation and the opening of consulates, in addition to its transformation by the Chinese People's Government to suppress the influence of National China (Taiwan) in Indonesia.

As for the second topic (the normalization of Chinese-Indonesian diplomatic relations 1951-1954), it dealt with the issue of the opening of Chinese consulates in Indonesia, as well as the exclusionary policy of the Sukiman government towards the Indonesian Communist Party and China, and the attempt to approach the American administration. Indonesian.

The study relied on a number of sources in English, the most important of which are:

- Howard Palfrey Jones, *Indonesia the Possible Dream*, New York, 1980, p.90
- Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, *The Possible Dream*, Copyright by Howard Palfrey Jones, 1st ed., New York, 1971.
- D.G.E. Hall, *A History of Southeast Asia*, London, 1958.
- J. R. E. Waddell, *An Introduction to South East Asia Politics*, Australasia, 1972.

The first topic

is the beginning of the Chinese-Indonesian diplomatic rapprochement (1949-1951).

After Indonesia declared its independence on the twenty-seventh of December 1949, the new leaders in Jakarta did not initiate a decision to seek diplomatic relations with Beijing, and this was a surprising development supported by some political parties in Islamic circles hostile to China that seeks to avoid relations with all communist countries ⁽¹⁾, and the diplomatic presence of Beijing in Indonesia will increase the sympathy of the Chinese minority in Indonesia with China, whatever form it will take ⁽²⁾.

Indonesian Prime Minister Muhammad Hatta expressed that the Indonesian government does not ignore relations with nationalist China (Taiwan), which would distort the independent and neutral features in Indonesian foreign policy (1), in addition to that, the Indonesian leaders were unable to make a decision regarding relations with Beijing, as The government of the United States of America opposed and exercised a variety of pressures to prevent any country from establishing relations with communist China, especially as it provided aid and diplomatic support in the first months of independence (2), and Hatta was also afraid of the diplomatic influence of nationalist China, which is a permanent member of the Council International security, which may use the right of veto against Indonesia's application for membership in the United Nations in the event that Indonesia establishes diplomatic relations with Beijing (3).

Despite the pressures that Indonesia was subjected to at the beginning of independence, it tried to initiate relations with countries with a socialist system in order to confirm an independent policy, and its leaders hoped

⁽¹⁾ Howard Palfrey Jones, *Indonesia the Possible Dream*, New York, 1980, P.90

⁽²⁾ Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, *The Possible Dream*, Copyright by Howard Palfrey Jones, 1st ed, new York, 1971, p. 93.

that this expression of autonomy would be recognized in Moscow and Beijing and that this would help them to normalize limited relations. with the communist forces (4).

Some communist countries took the initiative to recognize it. At the forefront of those countries was the Soviet Union, despite its criticism of the Indonesian political leaders (Sukarno-Hatta), which they described as reactionary. Moscow announced its recognition on the fifteenth of January 1950 (5), and after Moscow declared recognition of the independence of Indonesia and China were expected to do the same, but there was no positive signal from the Indonesian government even though the first telegram requesting recognition to Beijing was sent by the Dutch government on January 11, 1950 (6).

Zhou Enlai waited until March of 1950 and it becomes clear that the reason for Beijing's delay in the confessions came because of the ignorance of the Indonesian leaders of the nature of international protocols, as the message of Muhammad Hatta that he sent to China came through the Dutch colonial government in Indonesia, instead of sending it directly to China, and this would be Offended the Beijing government Conscious of the international protocol, and thus prompted to wait before responding to it, it seems that the circumstances of independence have caused a delay in the relationship between Indonesia and the People's Republic of China (7).

Nationalist China had seven consulates in Indonesia, established during Dutch colonialism. The Chinese nationalists were staunch supporters of the Indonesian independence cause, so Taiwan hoped the new government in Jakarta would establish relations with it. To this end, Nationalist China immediately recognized Indonesia (8).

On December 27, 1950, a special mission led by Major General Wu Tie-chuan was sent to Jakarta, hoping to enter into negotiations on relations between the two sides. During that time, the national consulates were still operating in Jakarta, and another Taiwanese mission was on its way to reach Indonesia, and since Jakarta did nothing to end its actual relations with the government of Taiwan, it is not surprising that the government of the People's Republic of China is also the one who is negotiating with the government of Indonesia, and this shows that the government of Indonesia was seeking recognition from both Chinas (9).

Muhammad Hatta's project was not capable of Beijing in any way, because he immediately informed General Wu of his government's intention to establish relations with Communist China, and at the same time told General Wu that the Chinese nationalist consulates in Indonesia would be closed in a few months (10).

On the twenty-eighth of March 1950, the People's Government of China recognized the independence of Indonesia through a telegram sent by Chinese Prime Minister Zhou Enlai to Muhammad Hatta, which included in the text, "The People's Government of China seeks to establish regular diplomatic relations with Jakarta on the basis of equality, mutual benefit, and mutual respect for territory." Sovereignty" (11), Muhammad Hatta responded on the thirteenth of April 1950, saying, "His government is pleased with the sincere desire on the part of the Chinese government to establish relations with Indonesia and that he agrees with Zhou Enlai's statement of the principles on which relations should be based" (12).

In May 1950, Zhou Enlai sent another telegram proposing the exchange of diplomatic missions at the level of ambassadors and proposing Wang Jen-shus as the first ambassador of the People's Government of China to Indonesia(13). Hatta agreed to these proposals in his reply sent to Beijing in June. In 1950, because Indonesia

had not yet selected an ambassador, it was proposed to appoint a charge d'affaires to work temporarily in Beijing. Wang Jinshu's appointment to Beijing was announced on July 20, 1950; After his arrival in Indonesia, he presented his credentials to President Sukarno on the fourteenth of August 1950 in Jakarta (14), almost six months later, that is, on the twenty-first of January 1950, Isaac Mahdi presented his credentials to Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai in Beijing to be Chargé d'affaires of the Indonesian Mission to the Government of the People's Republic of China, and it also represented an end to the diplomatic break between the two countries (15)

The Beijing government sought to establish consular representation in some of the islands of Indonesia and this issue was a priority for Beijing, as it made it clear that it was necessary to establish sufficient consular institutions to act on behalf of Chinese citizens in Indonesia in order to achieve the long-term political goal of undermining the position of the Kuomintang in Indonesia (16).

The KMT's influence in Chinese-Indonesian society was critical for twenty years, and its position did not weaken after the withdrawal of the Nationalist government led by Chiang Kai-shek to Taiwan in 1949, and because Taiwan's claim to represent China depended heavily on the support it received from thirteen million Chinese. In Indonesia, severing relations between the Chinese minority in Indonesia and the Nationalist government of China is a major goal of the policy of the People's Government of China, as they sent large remittances amounting to millions of dollars to Taiwan. Therefore, the money received from overseas Chinese has played an important role in changing the foreign exchange and ensuring the continuity of The flow of remittances and deposits from overseas Chinese to the mainland, if it is possible to increase the amounts should be one of the main reasons that Beijing wanted to clamp down on its rival Taiwan (17).

The Chinese People's Government has made it clear that the main tasks of the future diplomatic mission in Indonesia are to expand its influence in Chinese society, extract remittances, develop contacts with the Communists and get close to the three million people it claimed to be Chinese citizens, especially in light of the economic influence exercised by the Chinese residing in the country. In view of the concern that Jakarta feels about any possible subversive elements directed from abroad, the conflicting goals of Beijing and Jakarta quickly emerged when the issue of consular representation arose (18).

Ambassador Wang Jinshu began negotiations with the Indonesian government on this issue in October 1950. The talks continued for five months. Finally, a reconsideration of relations was reached and resulted in the opening of Chinese consulates in (Jakarta, Java, Medan, Sumatra, Borneo) in March 1951. (Indonesian) (19), the talks were distinguished by two main points:

1. The jurisdiction of the Chinese consulates.
2. The date on which the consulates will open.

Initially, Jakarta held that consulates should be established only after the status of Indonesian-born Chinese was clarified in accordance with the provisions regulating the division of citizenship in the Round Table Conference agreements (20), which these agreements stipulate that Indonesian-born Chinese who were previously absorbed under Dutch law as Dutch citizens who will acquire Indonesian citizenship within two years from the twenty-seventh of January 1949, unless issued A declaration to the contrary during this period, while those who officially refused Indonesian citizenship were considered Chinese nationals, and there are a

number of Chinese minority in Indonesia seeking to obtain Dutch citizenship (21), and therefore most locally born Chinese can obtain Indonesian citizenship naturally and argued The Indonesian government that since the total number of Chinese foreigners could not be determined before January 27, 1951, the end of the option period, consulates should not be opened before that date. There could be a unilateral Indonesian decision on their nationality and the position of the Indonesian government has been publicly criticized as having no legal basis and completely contrary to the wishes of the majority of the Chinese people (22).

According to the clarification issued by the Chinese government, the overseas Chinese will be required to obtain letters of explanation from the Chinese government in order to obtain the Indonesian possession.

The Jakarta government feared that any consulates that opened might be used by Beijing to encourage Indonesian-born Chinese to refuse Indonesian citizenship, and the words of the letters of explanation clearly indicate that Beijing has been willing, in principle since 1951(23), to give up the claims of some overseas Chinese provided that This is done on the basis of formal negotiations between the parties concerned, not unilaterally or under coercion. Despite some differences, the two sides were able to reach an agreement allowing the opening of the four consulates of the Beijing government in April 1951. (24)

Similar to the decision to establish diplomatic relations with Beijing, the consular agreement won unanimous support within the Indonesian government, and some members of the Cabinet opposed granting the People's Government of China any consular representation, on the grounds that doing so would inevitably promote the orientation of a number of Chinese refugees towards the government of China. popular, and may result in undesirable political repercussions (25).

It should be noted that the government of Muhammad Natsir (26) was seeking to prevent the opening of any Chinese consulates in Indonesia because Natsir believed that depriving China of diplomatic representation would push the Chinese minority to cooperate with Jakarta, as an overwhelming percentage of them work in commercial companies, and the government She did not think at the time that the presence of consulates of the Beijing government would decisively influence the choice of nationality by Chinese born in Indonesia (27).

Wang Jinshu, with the help of the Chinese government, launched a large-scale campaign to bring Chinese Indonesians into the orbit of the Beijing government's policies and programs. Consulates began to register Chinese families regardless of where their members were born to obtain funds for various activities sponsored by the consulates, Chinese missions and teaching materials in Chinese schools, establishing a new system. for associations (28).

The result of the Chinese power struggle in Indonesia was that Beijing was able to achieve an early victory when the Chinese Bank in Indonesia cut off its relations with Taiwan and started dealing with the Chinese People's Government, which made most of the Chinese personalities, the rich and influential in Indonesia follow many of the Chinese, and another result is the strengthening of power Economic and political of the Chinese Embassy throughout the country, although Jakarta objects to many of the political activities of the Chinese Embassy, especially in Chinese schools, the developing Chinese mini-civil war between the supporters of the Chinese National Party (KMT) and the Communist Party of China (CCP) exists inside Indonesia (29).

After the selection period expired in December 1951, the administrative agencies in Jakarta had only a fraction of the information they needed to be sure of the final result when they learned that between 600,000-

700,000, or roughly 40 percent, of the locally-born Chinese had rejected Officially Indonesian citizenship (30), this result was not expected, and raised serious doubts about the veracity of the saying of the other half of the Chinese population (31), Jakarta became increasingly apprehensive about the influence of the Chinese embassy on the internal affairs of Indonesia, moreover, the rejection of Indonesia on the part of this number The large number of Chinese people created serious disappointment and annoyance with the entire Round Table formula for addressing the nationality issue. For many inside and outside the government, it became clear that the 1949 Nationality Agreements raised more problems than they solved(32).

The second topic

the normalization of Chinese-Indonesian relations (1951-1954).

After 1950, the government had faced many inevitable problems by approving the citizenship option formula of 1949 and establishing diplomatic relations with Beijing, and making a decision to allow the People's Government of China to open consulates (33), and it is natural that such measures encouraged many Chinese Contacting the Chinese embassy, on the other hand, the Indonesian government was moving decisively to limit the most controversial political activities represented by the Chinese Wang Jinshu and the Chinese embassy, during that time the Chinese ambassador Wang Jinshu was attacking the United States of America by making speeches, especially since the Jakarta government Did not share his view on the policy of the United States of America (34), Wang's attacks were a violation of accepted diplomatic standards, and on several occasions in the years (1950-1951) the Indonesian government warned the Chinese ambassador to stop making anti-American speeches, It also took advantage of these opportunities to insist that the Chinese embassy limit its activities to normal diplomatic missions and stop its contacts with the locally-born Chinese whom Jakarta considered to be Indonesian subjects(35).

It seems that these warnings failed to achieve the desired response from Beijing, and soon the matter reached a climax, as Jakarta used a slight diplomatic dispute with the Beijing government in mid-1951 (36).

On June 22, 1951, after the Consul General of the People's Government of China Hu Yi arrived in Indonesia accompanied by nineteen other members of the newly appointed Chinese diplomatic staff, sixteen of them were refused entry by the Indonesian authorities even though all of them apparently had visas. An official entry had been approved by the Indonesian Embassy in Beijing (37), according to the reports of the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, claiming that the Chinese Embassy did not give advance notice to the Indonesian authorities of the arrival of the embassy staff, and that this procedure was repeated for the third time, and this is a violation of diplomatic norms (38).

Beijing immediately protested against this measure and indicated that this Indonesian action is evidence of an unfriendly attitude, as a result of which the concerned diplomatic staff had to return to China (39).

The Indonesian government announced that the unacceptable activities of the Chinese embassy had aroused and disturbed the Indonesian government, and that a large number of Chinese employees and diplomats had been sent to the embassy and consulates in Indonesia unnecessarily. In this regard, many Chinese individuals coming to the country, despite their official appointment as assistants, were in fact specialists in political education and Chinese foreign affairs. It is clear from this that the political anchor that Jakarta was

working on is the formal diplomatic representation of the Chinese embassy and consulates in Indonesia. Especially since the number of employees of the Chinese embassy and its four consulates was very small, compared to the number of employees of the US embassy and its consulates (eight).

During that time, Jakarta pursued a foreign policy more closely linked to the United States of America and the Western camp, as the Sukiman government decided to align Indonesia more closely with Washington by accepting aid under the Mutual Security Act with the United States of America, which provides for the establishment of effective military alliances Between the United States of America and the Western anti-communist camp (40).

Not only did the matter approach the US administration,(41) but the Indonesian government decided to take strict measures against the Main Bank of China and the Chinese embassy, and it seems that this step was also taken with the advice of the US embassy(42).

Tensions between the two sides increased, especially after the accusations made by the Prime Minister that there is a conspiracy led by The Indonesian Communist Party to overthrow the government, and in August 1951 Sukiman carried out a series of mass arrests of more than fifteen thousand people, including leaders of the Indonesian Communist Party and a large number of Chinese residing in Indonesia, as a result of which the Chinese embassy granted asylum to Ali Min, a prominent leader in the Indonesian Communist Party (43).

The Sukiman government was forced to release those it had arrested after failing to meet with parliament and prove the validity of the allegations it had taken as a justification for the campaign of arrests. By the end of 1951, Beijing's policy in Indonesia had reached a dead end, as China lacked the strength or influence to confront the mounting resistance from Jakarta.(44).

It is clear that the tension between Beijing and Jakarta that resulted from the provocative activities carried out by the Chinese embassy during two years (1950-1951) was a stumbling block in the file of the development of Chinese-Indonesian relations on the one hand, and with its Asian neighbors on the other hand. The middle of 1951 played a major role in Indonesia, despite the hostility of the Sukiman government to the government of the People's Republic of China (45), in addition to Beijing's sudden withdrawal in late 1951 and the summoning of Wang Jin Shu, and this was the first clear indication of the end of Beijing's hard line in Indonesia and the beginning of a more conciliatory approach. The main obstacle to the normalization of relations is the political orientation of the Sukiman government, which was not interested in dismantling its relations with the United States of America in order to gain the approval of the Republican People's Assembly, as it was not willing to normalize its relations with China (46).

The Indonesian government had hoped to negotiate a transfer of sovereignty by 1951 in accordance with the Round Table Conference agreement governing the matter, but after negotiations broke down with the Dutch, the Sukiman government turned to the United States for support. Meanwhile, Beijing was beginning to draw closer to Indonesia. And making many concessions, as this was evident through the interviews that were conducted with Chargé d'Affaires Ishaq Mahdi on (February 18th - June 5th 1951), and the gentle treatment that he and other diplomats from Southeast Asia received in Beijing, accompanied by the arrival of the Korean War to A dead end, and it should be noted that friendly contacts were repeated with the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as Mahdi indicated that the Chinese seemed very keen to normalize relations with Indonesia

since 1952, and that they also wanted to settle the issue of Chinese nationality abroad, this testimony indicates that Beijing It was by no means reluctant to concede its claims to the overseas Chinese (47).

Indonesia relied on the United States of America to strengthen its policy in the West Irian However, it did not fully support the policy of the United States of America in the Far East, but the adoption prompted Sukiman to follow Washington's initiative regarding Indonesia's declared neutrality in the Cold War, and in conjunction with that Sukiman governments signed in September 1951, the Japanese peace treaty that was strongly opposed by the Indonesian parliament He abstained from voting for this treaty (for this reason ratification was delayed until 1958), but the government managed to weather the storm, and the second measure of the Sukiman Cabinet was its decision in February 1952 to accept American assistance under the Mutual Security Act of 1951 (48), in the meantime a crisis broke out Muslim Student Union This incident marked the departure of the last ruler loyal to the United States of America, and this step precipitated a more serious political crisis and ended with the resignation of Sukiman the following month, and the government that succeeded it is considered a turning point in the history of post-independence in Indonesia as it set out to formulate a new concept Indonesian foreign policy and its transition from attachment to the Western camp that had prevailed since 1950 to a greater degree of independence in foreign affairs (49).

The new Willowo government worked to draw a new horizon for Indonesian foreign policy by avoiding controversial foreign policy decisions. As a result, no new attempts were made to conclude military, economic or technical assistance agreements by the United States of America and the Western camp (50), and plans to restore The conquest of western Irian with the Dutch, and on the other hand, the essence of the policies of the Willowbo government towards the communist countries did not differ radically from the essence of the policies of Hatta and Natsir (51), nor did Willowbo try to normalize relations with China and did not make any effort to fill the vacant position of ambassador in Beijing and the Willowbo government did not seek To establish diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union (52).

Thus, the foreign policy of the Willowo government gave little positive encouragement to the development of the file of Chinese-Indonesian relations. This position contradicts the position of other Asian neutrals, who were improving their relations with Beijing. On the other hand, indirect changes were taking place in the internal political situation in Indonesia with the influence of Chinese arms. Inside Indonesia, although it did not directly affect China's policy towards Indonesia, and one of the important factors in the Chinese government's planning towards Indonesia was that the Willowo Cabinet obtained support from the Indonesian Communist Party in Parliament. This support symbolizes the beginning of new understandings in the file Foreign Policy(53).

The Indonesian Communist Party became a legal party after obtaining sixteen seats in the provisional parliament. They were unable to find political understandings with all the governments that were formed, as they stood in opposition to all governments since the first government formed by Hatta until the Willowo government. Labor strikes and other disturbances, which resulted in major clashes, perhaps the most prominent of which was the raids launched by Sukiman in August 1951, which led to the weakening and discrediting of the party(54). (on changing party line)(55), in March 1952 the Communist Party of Indonesia made the switch,

announcing that it would support the Willobo cabinet on the condition that the latter's policies were progressive and patriotic(56).

The decision to give the support of the Communist Party of Indonesia (CPI) to political action in the Wilobo government was a result of changing the style of the Communist Party of Indonesia and its active involvement in the political arena and avoiding the discredited incitement tactics, and in this way the party hoped to build a mass of the masses and strong trade unions and focus its attack on the imperialist and feudal elements and their supporters Local, the tactical objectives of the new united front policy were to exploit the dangerous frictions that began to develop between the political parties in Indonesia (57), and the Indonesian Communist Party, with the support of the People's Government of China, adopted the issue of liberating western Irian, and the claim to the region became a major concern of Indonesian foreign policy by the year 1952 (58).

It is clear from the course of events that the Chinese government sought, through the Indonesian Communist Party, to inflame the general situation inside Indonesia, by increasing anti-liberal nationalist feelings among all Indonesians, taking advantage of the Western Irian issue, which I want it to turn into an internal political radicalism that would help restore Popular confidence in the Indonesian communists, and this is what China was seeking.

The Wilobo government was the first government since independence to be led by the People's Democratic Party. Although it was based on a fragile parliamentary coalition of the PDP, Machumi, and (Socialist Party of Indonesia) factions, it found favor with the Indonesian communists, who found a strong interest in supporting Wilobo and cooperating with some parties. The other policy is to remove the anti-communist factions from the Indonesian government (59).

It seems that Aydit's shift to a united front policy with the Indonesian political parties that had been agreed upon with the Beijing government in 1951 had focused on the legal struggle, excluding radical social and economic programs in the countryside, or even focusing explicitly on political action among the peasants as it is from It is difficult to see Chinese influence behind the transformation of the Indonesian Communist Party if we look closely at China's diplomatic behavior towards Indonesia at this time.

The new government played an important role in the Indonesian Communists' attempt to return to politics, as the Beijing government worked to exert influence on the Indonesian Communist Party to bring its policies in line with P China In October 1952 (60), the Chinese government suggested holding discussions with Jakarta on the establishment of trade relations between the two countries (61).

Favorable opportunities for Beijing to improve relations with Jakarta began in June 1953, after the formation of a new government headed by Ali Sastro Amidjojo. The majority (62), and the party was able to play this major role, because the government was based on a weak coalition led by the left wing of the People's Party and was in dire need of obtaining support to achieve a majority for the purpose of excluding conservative Islamic parties, with parliamentary support from the far left, and it cannot That this happens only by the Indonesian Communist Party, although the latter was not invited to a direct meeting of the Council of Ministers (63).

The Indonesian Communist Party regained its previous credentials. Moreover, the support provided to Ali Sastromidjo helped the party develop its campaign to build mass organizations, thus isolating anti-Muslims.

Beijing was encouraged by the Cabinet's commitment to forming a government that adopts its foreign policy on the basis of anti-colonialism and its decision to normalize relations with Communist countries, on most of the issues of the Cold War, moreover, during the tenure of this government, resolving the Western Irian issue and asserting the leadership role in the Afro-Asian world have become two dominant goals of Indonesia's foreign policy, so the pursuit of these goals would lead to progress in relations Indonesian Chinese and thus opened the way for a more active relationship with the communist forces (64).

The first step taken by the Council of Ministers to improve relations with China was to send Arnold Mononutu (66) in October 1953 to Beijing as the first Indonesian ambassador to the Chinese people's government, and cooperation was done on the economic side, and in November 1953 a trade agreement was signed between China and Indonesia for two years (67), and the Council of Ministers also called for the establishment of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union in March 1954 (68).

Beijing responded to these encouraging developments in November 1954 by sending Huang Chen (69) as its new ambassador to Jakarta, a senior diplomat who worked in Eastern Europe. They have not been able to discuss it yet (70).

Conclusion

The relations between China and Indonesia constitute one of the main pillars of Asian security, given that the two countries have a geographical factor, in addition to that, they are preparing new markets for armaments, which guarantees them a distinguished role in the future.

Indonesia is among the most important countries in Asia and has the most influence on China politically, economically and militarily, so the research reached a set of results:

- China managed to subjugate the Indonesian government despite the great opposition from the Indonesian political parties.
- China was able to eliminate all its political competitors in Indonesia represented by the United States of America and the Soviet Union.
- China took advantage of the Indonesian crises to achieve its expansionist goals in Indonesia, such as the western Iran crisis.
- China achieved its first diplomatic victories in Indonesia, especially its deportation of some governments that are not loyal to it in Indonesia.

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 41. Sukiman: An Indonesian politician born in 1896 on the island of Java. He was one of the leaders of the labor movements in the 1920s. In addition to his political activity, he became one of the most prominent men of the "Company Islam" party, the oldest Islamic Indonesian party, and after the declaration of Indonesia's independence on the 7th On August 10, 1945, the Muslim Shura Council party was established, which is known as "Mashumi" for short. Sukiman became its president during the period 1945-1950, and he dominated the party during this period as a result of his political activity and moderation, as he was a person acceptable to most of the leaders of the affiliated Islamic parties and organizations. under the banner of Mashumi. He became Minister of the Interior in one of the first ministries of the Republic (before the Dutch recognition of Indonesia's independence in 1949). For more, see Muhammad Diaa Shehab, the previous source, p. 47.

42. Justus M. Van der Kroef, *Nasution, Sukarno and West New Guinea Dispute*, Asian Survey, Vol. I, No. 6, London, August 1961, P.20.
43. J. R. E. Waddell, *Op.Cit.*, P.205.
44. Donald Wilhelm, *Op.Cit.*, P 37.
45. Justus M. Van der Kroef, *Nasution, Sukarno and West New Guinea Dispute*, P.20.
46. Guy J. Pauker, *The Role of the Military in Indonesia*, *Research in The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries*, Edited by John J. Johnson, New Jersey, N.D., P.202.
47. Donald Wilhelm, *Op.Cit.*, P 41-43.
48. Leslie H. Palmer, *Op. Cit.*, p.67; Nathanil Peffer, *The Far East A Modern History*, Edited by Allan Nevins and Howard M. Ehrmann, New York, 1958, P. 438.
49. A.y. Drugo, *Indonesia, Research in Southeastasia, History, Economy Policy*, Translated by David Fidlou, Moscow, 1972, P.227.
50. J. D. Legge, *Op. Cit.*, P. 229; Max Beloff, *Soviet Policy in the Far East, 1944-1951*, London, 1953, P. 217.
51. Leslie H. Palmer, *Op.Cit.*, P.66-71.
52. D. G.E. Hall, *Op.Cit.*, P.735.
53. Arnold C. Brackman, *Indonesian Communism A History*, New York, 1963, P.82
54. Den Adit (1923-1965): Politician and leader in the Indonesian Communist Party. He was born in Sumatra, where he completed his primary education. After that, he traveled to Jakarta to complete his secondary studies. He also had a role in founding the Pemoda organization that resisted the Japanese occupation. In 1948, Adit fled to Vietnam after the Madiun rebellion, which was led by the Indonesian Communist Party, and then moved to China. In 1948, he returned to Indonesia to be a member of the party's political bureau, then became president of the Indonesian Communist Party in 1951. For expansion, see:
Robert A. Gorman and others, *Biographical Dictionary of Marxism*, Greenwood Press, Connecticut, 1986, p.20.
55. (Tempie Wanmaker, *American Foreign Policy Today*, London, (N.P.), p.179.
56. (D.G.E. Hall, *Op.Cit.*, p.741.
57. Donald Wilhelm, *Op.Cit.*, P 56.
58. Guy J. Pauker, *Current Communist Tactics in Indonesia*, Asian Survey, Vol.I, No.3, London, May 1961, p.30.
59. Charles B. McLane, *Soviet Strategies in South East Asia, An Exploration of Eastern Policy Under Lenin and Stalin*, New York, 1966, PP.406-407.
60. J.R.E. Waddell, *Op.Cit.*, p.207.
61. Guy J. Pauker, *The Soviet Challenge in Indonesia*, p.614.
62. Ali Sastro: An Indonesian politician born in the city of Central Java on the twenty-first of May 1903. He studied at the Faculty of Law at Leiden University in the Netherlands in 1927 and graduated from it. He also worked as a member of the Indonesian Association (Brahmbunen Indonesia) in the Netherlands.

He practiced law after Returning from Europe in Jogjakarta. He participated in issuing the weekly magazine (Janmet). Appointed as Undersecretary of the Minister of Information after the independence of Indonesia. He assumed the position of Minister of Education in 1947. He was appointed Ambassador of the Republic of Indonesia in Washington. In 1953 he was appointed Prime Minister. For more, see: Indonesian Affairs Magazine, No. 2, Jakarta, August 1956, pg. 25.

63. J. R. E. Waddell, *Op.Cit.*, P.209; Colin Brown, *A Short History of Indonesia*, Australia, 2003, p.145 .
64. S. Takdir Alisjahbana, *Op.Cit.* , P.154.
65. Donald Wilhelm, *Op.Cit.*,P 74.
66. Arnold Mononoto (1896-1983) Indonesian politician: He was born on September 5, 1896 in North Sulawesi. He was an Indonesian nationalist and politician. He studied high school in the Netherlands and served as Minister of Information in the government.
Indonesian during the period (1949-1950), and again from 1951 (1953), he became the first ambassador of Indonesia to China in 1953, as well as the third dean of Hasanuddin University. A member of the Indonesian National Party, Mononoto also participated in the struggle for the independence of Indonesia. He was posthumously awarded the honorary title of National Hero of Indonesia. For more see Kifah Juma Wajar, *Political Developments in Indonesia 1945-1967*, an unpublished master's thesis, College of Education, Al-Mustansiriya University, 2004,
67. Douglas Hyde, *Confrontation in the East, A Backgroundbook*, London, 1965, P. 48;G. A. An reev, *Indonezeyskaya Iasudarstva*, Moscow, 1974, P. 192.
68. Guy J. Pauker , *The Soviet Challenge in Indonesia Forgin Affairs* , Vol 40 , No.4, New York , July 1962, P.612
69. Huang Jin (1909-1989) Chinese politician who served as Ambassador of the People's Republic of China to Indonesia between 1954 and 1961. Huang later served as Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China and Minister of Culture. For more see: Douglas Hyde, *Op.Cit.* ,P. 70-76
70. S. Takdir Alisjahbana, *Op.Cit.* , P.157.